The Carrot After the Stick?

Lester Pearson, a former Canadian prime minister, once described politics as the "skilled use of blunt instruments." And two of those instruments, for all politicians, are the carrot of positive incentives and the stick of coercion.

Even the madman of Libya, Muammar Qaddafi, understands this (in his own twisted way). Today's Washington Post reports  that he announced that his government will pay $400 to each family, basically bribing them to stay loyal. He also promised state employees up to 150 percent raises. Will it work? Umm . . . that's doubtful (to put it mildly).

Interestingly, though, Qaddafi continues a pattern that we've seen across the Arab world:

• The day before a "Day of Rage" scheduled for February 14, Bahrain's King Hamad promised to pay every citizen of Bahrain $2650 as a "sign of appreciation."  
• During the last gasps of the Mubarak regime, his government announced that it would give state employees a 15 percent raise. 
• King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia jumped on the bandwagon this week, mandating a 15 percent raise for Saudi state employees--and billions of interest-free loans to help young Saudis get married, start a business, or build a house. 

Based on the reaction of Bahrainis, I think the carrot approach will actually backfire. Young people might well feel insulted by such blatant attempts to buy their loyalty. They are sick of this kind of politics of purchased loyalty. It obviously failed in Egypt.

And it's too late in Libya. There is already an armed revolt that is taking control of much of the rest of the country, isolating Qaddafi's control to the capital city of Tripoli. He's already slaughtered his own people; why would they be motivated by cash?

All eyes are on Saudi now. Even members of the royal family admit that political change is necessary. Can that happen peacefully or will there be conflict? Will the tried-and-tested politics of the rentier-oil-welfare state work? Will young people allow their loyalty to be purchased?

Or will they assert their dignity?

After the last few weeks of surprises, I'm betting on the latter. Watch Saudi Arabia in the next few weeks.

Bahrain: When Global and Local Collide

Globalization and the regime in tiny Bahrain are colliding today, keeping this tiny country at the top of international news. The crisis reflects both global trends and very localized political grievances.

The reason Americans should care about Bahrain is that it's located just off the coast of Saudi Arabia and across the gulf from Iran, a volatile neighborhood full of oil. In fact, most Saudi oil exports are loaded onto tankers near Bahrain. If things go pear-shaped in Bahrain, it could easily spill over to Saudi. Gas prices have already gone up in the U.S. because of oil traders' unease over protests.

But what are the global trends driving the Bahrain protests? Information technology, satellite television, and higher education, among other things, are contributing to the growth of an educated, Arab middle class. Some of this growing middle class were my students in Bahrain in 2004-05, and I was impressed by their tech-savvy, their idealism, and their global awareness. The region is full of such bright, earnest, educated young people who are often underemployed and living at home. 

One young man, who had just graduated, became a very good friend. His struggles in finding a meaningful job seem typical of his generation. He's bounced around a bit but feels stifled in Bahrain. Like many young Middle Easterners, he's trying to find a meaningful job that matches his skills (he has a Bachelor's in banking and finance and did some graduate work abroad). And, yes, he spends time on Facebook. 

His experience speaks to this table from a report based on International Labor Organization data and created for a World Economic Forum meeting in Jordan in 2007:

Employment of 15-24 year olds as a percentage of that group is the lowest in the Middle East and North Africa (the lowest of any region in the world). Which is one reason why young Bahrainis like my friend are frustrated.

But that's not the whole story. There are also very localized political issues driving the unrest in Bahrain, as I noted in an earlier post. (For a vivid photo essay on Bahrain, check out this Foreign Policy post.) It's only the Shiite community in Bahrain that is out in the streets, because they feel disempowered and discriminated against by the minority Sunni community. Unless their grievances are addressed and they gain some political power in Bahrain, this crisis will not end. One Bahraini Shia friend tells me that the young people are not afraid of the regime and will protest peacefully.

To get a sense of why the Shia are angry about the crackdown on the peaceful, sleeping Pearl Roundabout protestors, check out this disturbing clip from al Jazeera English or this disturbing clip from Nick Kristof of the New York Times. Reports today indicate that five people were killed in the crackdown. The Pearl Roundabout is now abandoned and surrounded by barbed wire. 

Compared to the 365 killed in crackdowns on the Egypt protests, five deaths might seem small in comparison. But consider the populations of each country. There are only 500,000 Bahraini citizens, so the five killed reflect a ratio of 1 death per 100,000 residents. Egypt's population is 80 million, so their ration is 1 death per 219,178 residents. In other words, the Bahrain crackdown had a more lethal impact relative to the total citizenry. 

Thousands of people are marching in funeral processions for slain protestors in Bahrain today. For the peace of our world, for our friends on all sides, let us pray that the death toll goes no higher.

What's Happening in Egypt and Bahrain?

The crowds have hardly dispersed in Cairo, and now this morning Bahrain is on the front page of the New York Times, at the top of National Public Radio's news broadcasts, and near the top of the leading stories on the Daily Beast blog. Two protestors were killed, and peaceful demonstrators now occupy the Pearl Roundabout (left).

What just happened in Egypt? The popular uprising of the younger generation in Egypt was less a "revolution" than a peaceful coup d'etat. A revolution overthrows an entire regime and results in a radically different one. Typically that means a popular uprising ousting a royal family and the rapid replacement of that family with a non-dynastic form (see France 1789, Russia 1917, Iran 1979).

By contrast, a coup (in French, literally a smashing blow) is a rapid change of government at the top, usually by the military. What happened in Egypt was that the military told Mubarak to go, and then they took over. This was more a coup than a revolution.

But could this change at the top lead to serious changes for the people at the bottom (the 40% of the population of Egypt that lives on $2 a day or less)? Will the military really share power with the people?

Their first move is moderately encouraging. According to a story in today's Times, the regime has appointed an eight-member panel of lawyers and judges to revise the Constitution. The chairman of the group, Tarek el-Bishri, was a leading critic of the Mubarak regime and the author of a book that's highly critical of Egypt's direction. Another member is a leading Coptic Christian, and a third, Sobhi Saleh, is a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. Constitutional changes, even by a representative group like this, won't put bread on the table for Egyptians, but they can provide the political framework for more representative government, which could help.

What's happening in Bahrain? Sadly, al Jazeera English isn't on top of this story as much as NPR's Peter Kenyon was this morning. That's because the Emir of Qatar pays the bills for AJE, and he's a bit worried about his fellow Sunni royal family friends in the Al Khalifa family--the family that rules Bahrain.

Roughly 70% of Bahrain's 500,000 citizens are Shia, while the royal family and its ruling cronies are Sunni. I say "ruling cronies," because the Al Khalifa have given citizenship to Sunni immigrants from South Asia, Yemen, Jordan, Syria, and elsewhere. They recruit these outsiders for the police and military, and they never hire Shia, because they don't trust them. The regime's fear is that these Shia are more loyal to Iran than to Bahrain.

My sense is that the younger Shia opposition forces are seizing on the momentum from Egypt to gain media attention for the their cause. It's not like they were sitting around until the Egypt protests. They've been protesting (the Al Khalifa would say complaining) for years. To try and head off protests, the King of Bahrain announced the other day that he would give every citizen 1,000 Bahraini dinars ($2650) in cash.

The Beatles could have told him that money can't buy you love. It may not even buy you peace. I think the Shia young people are insulted, and they're frustrated with Internet slowdowns. My prediction is that this will escalate by Friday (after midday prayers). Pray for peace on all sides.

People Power in Egypt

So Mubarak resigned today, and the military has taken over the reins of power. Which means that Egypt's uprising will not go down in the history books alongside Hungary in 1956, the Czech Republic in 1968, or Tienanmen Square in 1989. Instead, we can look to the Philippines in 1986, when Ferdinand Marcos was ousted by a People Power movement that took the U.S. government, a close ally of Marcos, by surprise. And the leader of this "yellow revolution," Corazon Aquino, led the transition. (Will there be an Egyptian Corey Aquino? Stay tuned.)

Watching al Jazeera English right now, it's impossible not to be moved. People in Egypt are ecstatic, stunned, exhilarated, screaming, and crying in the streets. They can't believe that a popular movement forced an entire regime out of power. This has never happened before in the Arab world. And just a few weeks ago no one could have imagined it--especially in Egypt. It's unbelievable.

Phase 6? The Egyptian Revolution Will Escalate Tomorrow

Hosni Mubarak made a speech in Egypt tonight, but he refused to step down. While he made some concessions to the opposition forces (amending the constitution), and even gestured toward the young people of Egypt, he did not got far enough to quell the protests.

While Mubarak played good cop, his vice president, Omar Suleiman, played bad cop. Suleiman gave a speech on Egyptian television not long after Mubarak, calling on the demonstrators to go home.

They will not go home. Tomorrow they will hold large-scale protests for the third Friday in a row. Eyewitness accounts from Tahrir Square this week--including this Thomas Friedman column and this Baltimore Sun story--describe a euphoric, peaceful, freedom-loving crowd. These protestors will be happy with nothing less than the ouster of Mubarak,his cronies, and his regime.

Before Mubarak had even finished speaking, the protesters camped out in Tahrir Square were jeering him. Totally unsatisfied, they and their friends will turn out in force tomorrow afternoon, following midday prayers.

It's clear that Mubarak and his regime just don't get what is happening in the Square. They think they can dribble out small concessions to meet tangible demands, which of course they are only granting under duress in the first place. They will only embolden the opposition, which has discovered that it can bring serious political change that was unthinkable just a few weeks ago.

Egypt: Phases 4 and 5

Developments in Egypt are heating up. Some of the loudest and largest crowds have gathered in Cairo's Tahrir Square. Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak is about to go on television, and he is expected to announce that he is stepping down. (Al Jazeera English remains essential viewing to be on top of the story, and I'm watching/listening to it right now.) This may all be rumor, but the tension is growing in Cairo.

I've been busy over the last week (although I still have a lot of papers to grade), and I've been unable to track the Egypt story as closely as I'd like. But it's clear that the struggle there has gone through two more phases.

First, early this week, the regime started a dialogue with some of the opposition forces, hoping that they could appease most of the the protesters. The young (20-30 year old) people who organized and drove the protests refused the dialogue and kept up their protests.

Second, in the past few days, it became clearer how organized and persistent these demonstrators were. They forced the regime's hand and didn't give up. They were also helped by some general strikes across Egypt yesterday. After more than two weeks of occupying Tahrir Square, it looks like they may have succeeded in their immediate demands for Mubarak to leave before they left. The release of Wael Ghonim, a Google executive who had helped organize the protests, seemed to catalyze the movement. Ghonim gave an emotional TV interview that showed the peaceful side of the younger protestors and the thuggishness of a corrupt regime. This may have been the final blow for the regime's credibility.

If and when Mubarak leaves, it will interesting to see what happens next.

Two Eyewitness Accounts from Tahrir Square

An anonymous Al Jazeera producer posted a brief and fascinating account of "The Battle of Tahrir Square" and what it was like to be in that area of Cairo yesterday (Wednesday, Feb. 2). Linked to the story are a batch of powerful still images.

And Foreign Policy posted an intriguing story by Blake Hounshell, who just arrived in Cairo and went straight to the Square today. He asks six important questions that, when answered, will help us know what's going on. His last question is especially pertinent:

Are we witnessing a revolution, a soft military coup, or a failed uprising? This is the million-dollar question, and one that I suspect can't be answered until events have run their course. Much depends on tomorrow's demonstrations: Has the regime succeeded in its usual game of divide and conquer, or will Egyptians' revulsion at this week's brutality send them to the streets in the millions?

Stay tuned . . . by tomorrow morning (East Coast US time) we should start to witness early answers to some of these questions.

A Strategic Game in Egypt?

Yesterday I said that Egypt was entering a third phase of political turmoil. A couple of observers are already framing this phase as a contest between the military-dominated Mubarak regime and its opponents in the streets. One commentator even thinks that the military has already won the game, but I hope that's wrong.

In a report issued today, the International Crisis Group, a worldwide NGO focused on diplomatic solutions, points out that many people are worried about a breakdown of law and order in Egypt, and are content to leave Mubarak in office until his term expires in September. As the report puts it,

The authorities, so far, have not suggested any willingness to concede on this point and have conditioned negotiations on an end to the protests. At the same time, the opposition refuses to enter any talks until the president goes and the violence against them stops; in this light, it is becoming increasingly difficult to imagine Egypt’s peaceful transition while he remains in office. Overcoming this obstacle will be difficult and could well require flexibility on both sides.

In other words, we are currently in the midst of a standoff in a two-actor game (akin to a game of Chicken) or a simple negotiating dilemma: the first one to blink or veer away from the collision loses the game.

Both sides have dug in: the regime insists that everyone go home and then they will talk to the opposition. The opposition (assuming it's united) insists that Mubarak leave office and his gangs stop attacking them, and then they will engage in talks (possibly with the current vice president, possibly not). They've reached a stalemate. Will anything break it?

In a post for Foreign Policy today, Robert Springborg, a longtime Egypt expert, pessimistically contends that Mubarak's military allies have already gotten the upper hand on the pro-democracy forces. Fomenting chaos first by unleashing the secret police to loot neighborhoods and attack protestors, the regime could contend that only the military could preserve law and order. With a new vice president and prime minister tied to the military, Springborg envisions a military-dominated regime for some time to come.

I agree that the opposition has been divided thus far, and that Mubarak's supporters have played a tricky strategy, but I disagree that they will necessarily succeed. With a more open media environment, the regime's cynical strategy has been clear to many Egyptians. They may have grown tired of such games.

I'm not sure this crisis is over yet. Enough popular energy has been unleashed that we can imagine more protests tomorrow after Friday's midday Islamic prayers. Tune in to al-Jazeera tomorrow morning to see who's right.

Watching a Revolution Unfold--Live

With increased globalization of media, we can now watch a revolution unfold live in real time. And a revolution is what Egypt is getting (unless something changes soon). Like Iran in 1979 or Eastern Europe in 1989, popular mobilization is driving events.

Al Jazeera's live stream continues to broadcast stunning live footage from the streets of the capital city, Cairo. In just the last few minutes, pro-government gangs on horseback and camelback charged into the crowds of anti-government demonstrators. (Some of them were carrying police IDs, which suggests that the regime fomented this counter-protest.) Groups are prying up pavement and throwing rocks at each other. It appears that anti-government forces are trying to keep the pro-Mubarak groups from getting to Tahrir Square, the center of the protests. With popular violence escalating, we are now in Phase 3 of the ongoing power struggle between the regime and its critics in the streets, with no glimpse of resolution.

Phase 1 of the protests ran from Tuesday to Friday of last week. The anti-government forces seized the initiative and surprised the regime with their bold and open contempt of the Mubarak regime. The police were ordered to crack down but failed. On Friday, January 28, the government shut down all Internet and mobile phone service, which only inflamed popular anger. After Friday midday prayers, thousands of people streamed to Tahrir (Liberation) Square in Cairo, although the police prevented many from coming by blocking passages on the two main bridges over the Nile (6 October Bridge and Qasr al-Nil Bridge). The military was ordered into the streets on Friday night, but they took no action. On Friday night, in a speech on Egyptian state television, Mubarak made his first concessions, dismissing his cabinet and appointing a new prime minister. He also claimed to be standing "on the side of the poor," a statement so far detached from reality as to be laughable.

Phase 2 began on Saturday. Defying a military curfew that was supposed to begin at 4:00 pm local time, hundreds of thousands of people poured out to Tahrir Square, at the center of Cairo. That night, looters, many of them carrying police IDs, rampaged through Cairo neighborhoods. The police disappeared from the streets and the military remained neutral, a position that they publicly announced as their official stance on Monday afternoon. Protestors also welcomed the military with hugs and smiles, doing nothing to provoke them. By Tuesday, with military protection, up to a million demonstrators responded to opposition leaders' calls to march, making these the largest demonstrations so far.

However, the opposition forces were not organized enough to march on any government sites. Had they surrounded the presidential compound in Heliopolis, they might have been able to convince Mubarak that he was truly in danger. (Of course, such a move would have put them in danger, too.) Instead, Mubarak continued to believe that he could survive this crisis--despite the protestors' demands that he go immediately. Unlike Tunisia's, Egypt's anti-government resistance is divided. That may be their undoing.

Today Egypt is in Phase 3, the escalation toward revolutionary violence. Last night (Tuesday night, February 1), in a speech on Egyptian TV, Mubarak offered a mix of responsiveness and stubbornness. He responded by announcing a few concessions, saying that his new vice president  would open a dialogue with opposition forces, that he would not run for re-election in the September presidential elections and that he would allow amendments to the constitutional articles that currently allow limits on candidates for presidential elections. But he did not explicitly rule out the possibility that his son Gamal could be one of those candidates. He also hinted darkly at the possibility of chaos, calling for people to return to normalcy. And he said that he planned to be buried in Egypt. In other words, he would not be leaving like Tunisia's Ben Ali.

Whether they are following orders or responding spontaneously to this speech, Mubarak's allies in the police are today fomenting counter-revolutionary chaos. To evoke the poet Dylan Thomas, instead of going gently into the good night, Mubarak is raging against the dying of the light. He and his regime cannot imagine giving up power. They will try to cling to power as long as possible, even if that brings violent clashes on the streets and widespread destruction of property. Mubarak will allow Egypt to burn before he will lose face.

Neither pro- nor anti-government forces have any leadership on the streets to restrain them. Unless the military topples Mubarak soon, this could easily escalate out of control into social breakdown and revolutionary chaos. Across the world, we are witnessing the utter collapse of a regime and a social revolution--live.

Why Are Egyptians Upset?

As protests swell in Cairo and schools are cancelled here in Ohio (due to snow and ice), CNN published a story based on interviews with people in the crowd  that helps explain why up to a million people have come out into the streets.

As one man shouted, "Mubarak has been here since Ronald Reagan."


A 23 year old man, who had struggled to arrive because the government shut down train services, said this:

I'd like to see a president in Egypt every eight years like in other countries. . . . This is just the country of rich people. I graduated from university and I speak four languages but I can't find a job because of nepotism and corruption. To do anything you have to pay money.

Sadly, his story is all-too-familiar for young Egyptians. Millions of them work hard, study hard, and strive to get ahead, but they are blocked by forces beyond their control. Their frustration was palpable to any visitor to Egypt who took the time to listen to them. These are bright, funny, thoughtful people who took jobs far below them just to buy food--or lost their dignity by paying bribes. Now they have finally had enough.

While much American commentary centers on fear for our strategic interests (and Israel's), not enough has focused on this straightforward demand for regular political change, economic opportunity, and less corruption. Although no government of any country can ever deliver all this, the people of Egypt (especially the young adults) will settle for Mubarak to go.

Call it term limits, Egyptian-style.

Not Tienanmen

In my previous post, I wondered if the Egyptian military would emulate China's in 1989. Today, it looks like we have an answer. Reuters is reporting that the military issued a statement saying that "the armed forces will not resort to use of force against our great people."

Mubarak will be gone within weeks, perhaps days.

Egypt's Crisis: Tunisia, Tumult, or Tienanmen?

For much of the past three days, I've been glued to al-Jazeera's English-language live streaming video feed, watching Egypt unravel. Their Cairo bureau has been shut down by the government, but they continue to broadcast the most detailed reports from the streets that I've seen. As I note briefly in the book, al-Jazeera is a great example of globalization, allowing English speakers to get a sense of how the Arab world frames events. Right now, this TV network based in Qatar is far ahead of the rest of the world's media outlets on the Egypt story, helping us understand what's really going on. (For the record, I've found New York Times coverage to be a solid second best.)

Egyptians have taken instant inspiration from Tunisia's ouster of Ben Ali due to a quick-moving media cycle, which now includes cellphones, text messaging, Facebook, and Twitter. Although Mubarak's regime tried to clamp down by shutting off virtually all Internet servers and mobile phone service in Egypt on Friday, people were still watching al-Jazeera, which was much harder to shut down (unless they turned off all electricity, and even then people could power up generators). And you can imagine how angry people were without internet or cellphones.

What does this have to do with globalization, you might ask. Drawing on Jan Aart Scholte's definition, we can say that globalization is the process of increasing simultaneous and instantaneous interactions. We are more and more able to track events as they happen, right along with the people living through them. Knowing people who live and work in Egypt, and having been there three times, I am stunned to imagine what they are going through and I feel like I am almost there.

Being a political scientist, though, I have to speculate about what might happen next. Will this be another Tunisia? Or something else?

Everyone's comparing Egypt's protests to Tunisia's recent Jasmine Revolution. But Egypt's masses seem much less organized, reflecting Egypt's larger, more atomized, and more oppressed society. So far there is still no credible opposition leadership, whereas Tunisia had labor unions and student groups that pulled together cohesive demonstrations. Egypt's protests seem more chaotic and leaderless. That could change, but so far I don't see this looking like Tunisia's successful revolution.

Instead, tumult has erupted. The last two nights have seen looting, as the police evaporated from the streets. Either the government has started to collapse or the withdrawal of police was a deliberate strategy by the authorities, with the hope that they could sow enough chaos to justify a military crackdown. Although the military has appeared on the streets, to the welcome of the crowds, they have held back so far (apart from protecting key government ministry buildings). Whether intentional or unintentional, the breakdown of law and order is a deeply disturbing development. Cairo, a city of 18 million people, was chaotic and crazy even when the state kept a strong hand. Now there's a good chance that all hell will break loose. It's not clear that any government will have an easy time of restoring control there.

So could this be a Tienanmen Square situation? In response to widespread student protests there, the Chinese government on June 4, 1989 ordered tanks to open fire and kill civilians, brutally crushing the reform movement and stopping any steps toward democracy.

It's hard to imagine Egypt's military attacking its own people. Plus, it's hard to imagine that this would work. The anger at the regime is much more widespread than what China had in 1989. Apart from students, most Chinese citizens were willing to put up with their government, which delivered rising living standards. Unlike China's regime, however, Egypt's is weak and ineffective. Any attempt to use force would probably be inconsistently applied, thereby provoking more frustration. And attempts to limit media coverage also won't work. The news will get out, even if in a trickle.

If Mubarak's regime thinks it can pull off a Tienanmen-style crackdown, I think they will be disappointed. And if they try it, they will only provoke a greater popular backlash, as well as international isolation, thereby contributing to Mubarak's eventual demise. Repression might stretch the crisis out for a while, prolonging the regime, but it will only shed blood for naught.

It could be a messy few weeks or months, but Mubarak will be out of office relatively soon. I pray that all this will happen as quickly and peacefully as possible--and that peace will be restored to the streets of Cairo with ease.